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Case: Pending Kimijungun Kapteijn v. Ministry of Justice (2026) CV 16- Latest: BiscuitPlaysYT
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Case: Pending Aero Nox v. Ministry of State (2026) CV 14
- Thread starter Aero
- Start date
- Joined
- Nov 13, 2025
- Messages
- 211
- Thread Author
- #22
Opening Statement
Your Honour,
On January 27th of this year, Plaintiff received, as a Member of Parliament, a query from the Minister of State to perform a Parliamentary audit. Plaintiff was taken aback by this query and asked the Minister to clarify which Act of Parliament gave them the authority to perform Parliamentary audits. The Minister's response? "The fact that I'm MoS minister?" Given his response was a question, it seems the Minister wasn't sure himself whether he possessed the Constitutional authority to perform Parliamentary audits. He later added that "It's been in the ministry policies for month[...]."
Nowhere in our body of law is the Ministry of State granted the ability to perform Parliamentary audits. Nowhere in our body of law is the Executive granted the ability to perform Parliamentary audits. Now, the Defense argues that while Parliamentary audits are no specified, the Ministry of State does have general auditing, surveying, and oversight powers. Let's review, for a moment, Section 11 of the Governing Structure Act:
As we can see here, there is absolutely no mention of the Ministry of State having the power to audit anything, let alone Parliament. So, we have to ask. From where does the Defense's assertion come? Could it be from the Open Governance Act? Surely that can't be since Section 1.a of that Act clearly states that "The Ministry of State shall conduct monthly audits of all Ministries to evaluate internal operations, workplace environments, and ministerial performance." This Act only grants to Ministry of State to audit Ministries, not Parliament.
Where does this leave us? With the Defense's claim that Ministries are empowered to create and manage their own programs. Which brings us to the crux of our issue and the legal questions at hand.
Does the Executive possess the right to grant itself responsibilities not defined in law?
To answer this question, we must look to the Constitution.
Article 2 of the Constitution lays out four facts of value to our legal question:
1. There are three distinct and co-equal branches of government.
2. The Parliament shall have the authority to makes laws.
3. The Executive shall have the authority to execute the law.
4. The Executive derives its power directly from the Parliament.
Here, Article 4 of the Constitution states that Cabinet Portfolios may be established through law and that the person appointed to head a portfolio shall hole the title of Minister of (Portfolio's name).
So let's put it all together.
The Minister of State is a person appointed to head the State portfolio. The State portfolio is established in the Governing Structure Act which does not include any mention of Parliamentary audits. In fact, Parliamentary audits are not defined anywhere in our body of law. The Minister of State is part of the Executive, and thus derives his power directly from the Parliament. The Minister, as a member of the Executive, only has the authority to execute the law.
So we ask again. Does the Executive possess the right to grant itself responsibilities not defined in law? The answer is clearly no. The Constitution only grants the Executive the authority to execute the law. By asserting the ability to give itself responsibilities not defined in law, the Executive is usurping the Parliament's Constitutional authority. They are blatantly making a power grab and threatening the balance of our three co-equal branches of government.
Today, we respectfully ask this Court to intervene. We seek the immediate cessation of all activities by the Ministry of State, and the Executive, that are not defined by law, particularly these unconstitutional Parliamentary audits. We trust that you will find our arguments compelling and grant any further relief that the Court deems just and proper.
Thank you, Your Honour.
Your Honour,
On January 27th of this year, Plaintiff received, as a Member of Parliament, a query from the Minister of State to perform a Parliamentary audit. Plaintiff was taken aback by this query and asked the Minister to clarify which Act of Parliament gave them the authority to perform Parliamentary audits. The Minister's response? "The fact that I'm MoS minister?" Given his response was a question, it seems the Minister wasn't sure himself whether he possessed the Constitutional authority to perform Parliamentary audits. He later added that "It's been in the ministry policies for month[...]."
Nowhere in our body of law is the Ministry of State granted the ability to perform Parliamentary audits. Nowhere in our body of law is the Executive granted the ability to perform Parliamentary audits. Now, the Defense argues that while Parliamentary audits are no specified, the Ministry of State does have general auditing, surveying, and oversight powers. Let's review, for a moment, Section 11 of the Governing Structure Act:
As we can see here, there is absolutely no mention of the Ministry of State having the power to audit anything, let alone Parliament. So, we have to ask. From where does the Defense's assertion come? Could it be from the Open Governance Act? Surely that can't be since Section 1.a of that Act clearly states that "The Ministry of State shall conduct monthly audits of all Ministries to evaluate internal operations, workplace environments, and ministerial performance." This Act only grants to Ministry of State to audit Ministries, not Parliament.
Where does this leave us? With the Defense's claim that Ministries are empowered to create and manage their own programs. Which brings us to the crux of our issue and the legal questions at hand.
Does the Executive possess the right to grant itself responsibilities not defined in law?
To answer this question, we must look to the Constitution.
Article 2 of the Constitution lays out four facts of value to our legal question:
1. There are three distinct and co-equal branches of government.
2. The Parliament shall have the authority to makes laws.
3. The Executive shall have the authority to execute the law.
4. The Executive derives its power directly from the Parliament.
Here, Article 4 of the Constitution states that Cabinet Portfolios may be established through law and that the person appointed to head a portfolio shall hole the title of Minister of (Portfolio's name).
So let's put it all together.
The Minister of State is a person appointed to head the State portfolio. The State portfolio is established in the Governing Structure Act which does not include any mention of Parliamentary audits. In fact, Parliamentary audits are not defined anywhere in our body of law. The Minister of State is part of the Executive, and thus derives his power directly from the Parliament. The Minister, as a member of the Executive, only has the authority to execute the law.
So we ask again. Does the Executive possess the right to grant itself responsibilities not defined in law? The answer is clearly no. The Constitution only grants the Executive the authority to execute the law. By asserting the ability to give itself responsibilities not defined in law, the Executive is usurping the Parliament's Constitutional authority. They are blatantly making a power grab and threatening the balance of our three co-equal branches of government.
Today, we respectfully ask this Court to intervene. We seek the immediate cessation of all activities by the Ministry of State, and the Executive, that are not defined by law, particularly these unconstitutional Parliamentary audits. We trust that you will find our arguments compelling and grant any further relief that the Court deems just and proper.
Thank you, Your Honour.
- Joined
- Jun 30, 2024
- Messages
- 242
Your Honor, the Ministry of State has committed no wrongdoing here, as we will show.
This is a voluntary audit program. The Ministry of State has regularly included Parliament in this program in the interest of greater governmental transparency and feedback. No Member of Parliament has ever been punished for not participating. No injury or harm has been committed.
Plaintiff claims executive overreach, because a Ministry is asking Members of Parliament voluntary questions that the MPs can ignore without consequences. Voluntary surveys of the legislature is not a separation of powers issue, when Plaintiff could have chosen not to respond, without punishment.
To respond more directly to claims Plaintiff made: the Ministries make up the vast majority of the Azalea Isles Government. It is not exaggeration or inappropriate to say that the Ministry of State has general oversight powers, when it is responsible for overseeing most of the Azalean Government, just as it is not exaggeration to say the Prime Minister leads the Executive branch, despite agencies like the Bank of Azalea existing and not being directly subject to the Prime Minister's control as Ministries are.
The Members of Parliament are paid for the work they do, and the Ministry of State has a voluntary policy to allow them to include their achievements or concerns in the Ministry's audit reporting, to be put in with the rest of the responses garnered from individuals paid by the government. It also allows them to ignore the Ministry altogether and choose not to participate.
The Defendant is not legislating from the Executive branch, or disregarding Parliamentary limits. The Defendant has an optional way for Members of Parliament to submit responses to an existing program that fulfills legislative requirements, without penalty. There is no usurping of parliamentary authority or violation of the law, and Plaintiff's narrow lens does not make sense in this application.
This program yields the Executive branch no additional power while usurping no power of another branch or agency, gives MPs a voluntary opportunity to participate, and inflicts no punishment. The Plaintiff does not accuse the Defendant of giving itself unlawful enforcement powers, either. It is not our belief, Your Honor, that such an optional program, aligning with broader Ministry responsibilities per the Open Governance Act and without any ability to inflict harm, trespasses the separation of powers.
Thank you.
This is a voluntary audit program. The Ministry of State has regularly included Parliament in this program in the interest of greater governmental transparency and feedback. No Member of Parliament has ever been punished for not participating. No injury or harm has been committed.
Plaintiff claims executive overreach, because a Ministry is asking Members of Parliament voluntary questions that the MPs can ignore without consequences. Voluntary surveys of the legislature is not a separation of powers issue, when Plaintiff could have chosen not to respond, without punishment.
To respond more directly to claims Plaintiff made: the Ministries make up the vast majority of the Azalea Isles Government. It is not exaggeration or inappropriate to say that the Ministry of State has general oversight powers, when it is responsible for overseeing most of the Azalean Government, just as it is not exaggeration to say the Prime Minister leads the Executive branch, despite agencies like the Bank of Azalea existing and not being directly subject to the Prime Minister's control as Ministries are.
The Members of Parliament are paid for the work they do, and the Ministry of State has a voluntary policy to allow them to include their achievements or concerns in the Ministry's audit reporting, to be put in with the rest of the responses garnered from individuals paid by the government. It also allows them to ignore the Ministry altogether and choose not to participate.
The Defendant is not legislating from the Executive branch, or disregarding Parliamentary limits. The Defendant has an optional way for Members of Parliament to submit responses to an existing program that fulfills legislative requirements, without penalty. There is no usurping of parliamentary authority or violation of the law, and Plaintiff's narrow lens does not make sense in this application.
This program yields the Executive branch no additional power while usurping no power of another branch or agency, gives MPs a voluntary opportunity to participate, and inflicts no punishment. The Plaintiff does not accuse the Defendant of giving itself unlawful enforcement powers, either. It is not our belief, Your Honor, that such an optional program, aligning with broader Ministry responsibilities per the Open Governance Act and without any ability to inflict harm, trespasses the separation of powers.
Thank you.