Your Honour,
Appellant asks this Court to:
- declare unconstitutional the provisions of the Civil Suit Reform Act ("the Act") requiring pre‑filing signed class membership and pre‑agreed payout agreements (Act §2.d–e);
- reverse the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal and remand with instructions to permit class certification proceedings consistent with this opinion; and
- issue any necessary injunctive relief preventing enforcement of the unconstitutional provisions.
I. The Act’s Mandatory Pre‑filing Consent and Payout Requirements Violate Article 1’s Guarantees of Equal Treatment, Freedom of Association, and Access to Courts.
A. Article 1 guarantees inviolable protections including equal treatment and freedoms of assembly/association subject only to reasonable limits prescribed by law. The challenged provisions are not reasonable: they deny plaintiffs practical access to collective litigation by imposing impossible preconditions where class members are numerous, anonymous, or transient.
B. Requiring every putative member’s signed consent and payout acceptance prior to filing operates as a substantive bar to collective redress for the poor, dispersed, or transient, creating de facto unequal access to remedies - contrary to equal treatment.
C. The statute chills freedom of association by converting litigation‑association into a contractual obstacle enforceable before judicial adjudication, deterring ad hoc or spontaneous collective actions.
II. The Act Denies Procedural Due Process by Forcing Pre‑Adjudicative Contractual Certification and Foreclosing Court‑Managed Notice and Certification.
A. Due process in class litigation fundamentally depends on judicially supervised mechanisms: the court must determine commonality, adequacy, and manage notice and opt‑in/opt‑out protections to protect absent parties and defendants alike.
B. By shifting the factual and procedural burden of assembling signed memberships and payout agreements to plaintiffs before the court evaluates certification, the Act deprives courts of their gatekeeping role and denies absent members procedural protections (e.g., independent notice, meaningful choice, and court oversight of settlement fairness).
C. Such pre‑filing contractual requirements produce arbitrary outcomes across claimants and districts and fail to provide the individualized procedural safeguards required before binding absent persons to a payout agreement.
III. The Act Unconstitutionally Encroaches on Judicial Power, Violating Article 3 and Separation of Powers.
A. Article 3 vests the Judiciary with authority to interpret law and manage court procedures. Class certification and pre‑trial process are quintessential judicial functions - assessing commonality, adequacy of counsel, fairness of settlements, and issuing notices.
B. The Act attempts to prescribe outcome‑determinative prerequisites for court access and adjudication - substantive rules of preclusion and certification - that divest courts of their constitutional role and usurp judicial process.
C. Where Parliament seeks to regulate litigation procedures, it must do so within constitutional bounds and without removing the Judiciary’s core adjudicative responsibilities. The challenged provisions effectively legislate away those responsibilities.
IV. The Statutory Scheme Is Overbroad and Not Narrowly Tailored; Less Restrictive Alternatives Exist.
A. Even assuming Parliament may set reasonable litigation qualifications, the Act is overbroad: it forbids collective litigation unless plaintiffs perform burdensome, often impossible pre‑filing feats; this sweeps in ordinary collective harms (consumer defects, tenant blockages, environmental harms) and prevents judicial resolution.
B. Narrowly tailored alternatives protect defendants and ensure fairness while preserving access: conditional certification, court‑supervised notice and opt‑in/opt‑out, preliminary hearings to determine class composition, and judicial review of settlement terms.
C. Because less restrictive means are available and commonly used in constitutional systems to balance interests, the Act’s blunt mandatory consent/payout preconditions cannot stand.
V. Unequal Application Demonstrated by Prior Judiciary Practice Requires Invalidation.
A. The Court should consider the practical application of the statute - how it has been enforced. The public record in the “Writ of Requisition for the Dead” (
https://www.cityrp.org/threads/writ-of-requisition-for-the-dead.3008/) proceeding shows a governmental writ applied against a class without the presence of individually filed consents or payout agreements, and the matter proceeded. That precedent demonstrates selective or inconsistent enforcement that exacerbates the Constitution’s equal‑treatment concerns.
B. Unequal enforcement of legislative prerequisites that determine access to courts demands strict scrutiny because the statute’s burden on rights operates arbitrarily and discriminatorily; such inconsistent practices strengthen the Appellant’s claim that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional in both text and application.
